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himself is responsible for any delay by intentionally failing to appear, he cannot
expect to have his motion for dismissal granted. 6 It would seem, therefore, that
the defendant is not always entitled to an immediate trial. However, the action
should commence with as much dispatch as can be had from the circumstances.
It should be noted that in Sigie v. Superior Court1 and in Dearth v. Superior
Court'8 that some, but not all of Ithe available departments, were handling crimi-
nal matters. Some of the departments of the court were occupied with civil cases.
Will the defendant merit a dismissal where the delay is caused by all the depart-
ments being crowded with pendig criminal matters?'9 It has been held that in
such a case the defendant must wait until his turn comes in its regular order, since
prior pending criminal cases would take precedence over his trial. Hence, under
these facts there is "just cause" Ifor the consequent delay.20
It is incumbent upon the defendant, if he desires to make a motion for dismis-
sal, to make his motion in the court where the criminal action is pending. There
is no duty upon the court to order a dismissal under section 1382 unless the de-
fendant demands it. This right, like any statutory privilege, is subject to being
waived by the defendant.2 ' Upon the defendant's making this motion for dismissal,
the prosecution then assumes the burden of showing just and reasonable cause for
the delay. Prejudice to the defendant is presumed on the violation of his statutory
privilege.22
In conclusion, it should be added that California has taken some steps forward
in an attempt to interpret the elusive terms "speedy trial" and "just cause." Under
circumstances where criminal cases are not given precedence over civil matters it
would seem that counsel for th defendant may cite the two most recent cases
on this matter23 and ask for a dismissal. But where conditions are such that sec-
tion 1050 cannot be used as a yaildstick to determine what is a "speedy trial" or a
"just cause," some confusion is unavoidable. Since it is improbable that the courts
by themselves will arrive at any uniform rule, where the matter is left up to their
discretion in each case, a strong argument can. be made for providing a statutory
standard. It seems reasonable, at least to this writer, that both the prosecution
and the criminal defendant in these cases are entitled to know where they stand
under the "speedy trial" provision of the state constitution.
David L. Alen
INSURANCE: CONSTRUING AN ASSAULT TO NEGATIVE RECoVERY UNDER AN
INSURANcE POLICY.
In a recently decided case,' the Court of Appeals of Alabama, in denying
relief from liability sought by thie insurer, held that injuries which led to the in-
sured's death were accidental within the meaning of a policy insuring against
accidental death. The insured, a Ia-year-old girl, upon learning that her boy friend,
16 People v. Duffy, 110 Cal.App. 631, 294 Pac. 496 (1930).
17 Supra note 1.
IS Sura note 2.
19 Murphy v. Superior Court, 53 CalApp. 6, 200 Pac. 483 (1921).
20 People v. Vasalo, 120 Cal. 168, 52 Pac. 305 (1898).
21Ex parte Fennessy, 54 Cal. 101 (1880).
2 2 People v. Angelopolos, 30 CalApp.2d 538, 86 P.2d 873 (1939).
23 Supra notes 1 and 2.
1 American Life Insurance Company v. Morrs, 72 So.2d 414 (Ala. 1952).
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one Gilmore, had visited the room of another girl late at night, armed herself with
a knife, which she at no time attempted to use, and confronted Gilmore. An argu-
ment ensued and the insured struck Gilmore, who in turn struck the insured with
a knife, causing the insured to bleed to death. The case was submitted to the jury
for determination of whether the insured's death arose as a result of accident or
from participation in an assault within the meaning of the policy so as to relieve
the insurer from liability The jury returned a verdict in favor of the insured's
administrator.
On appeal, the court, in affirming the judgment of the lower court, took the
view of the weight of authority in this country, to wit:
"Moreover it has been held that the aggression or assault on the part of the insured
which will relieve the insurer from liability under its policy must be such as would
justify the person assaulted, acting as a reasonably prudent person, in injuring or taking
the life of the insured."
2
In cases such as the one under comment, a decided conflict of authority exists,
arising solely from the construction placed upon the word assault as it is used in
life and accident insurance policies. The term is found in policies insuring against
the "result of bodily injury effected solely through violent, external and accidental
means." The policies provide that: "This policy does not cover death caused
from participation in an assault or felony "23
The conditions requisite for relieving the insurer of liability for injury or death
to the insured, arising from an assault wrongfully committed by the insured upon
another, are two-fold. The injury must not only be the natural and probable result
of the insured's intentional acts, but must also have been reasonably foreseeable.4
As to the degree of foreseeability required to relieve the insurer of liability, there
is much conflict.
In the case of Kalahan v. Prudential Insurance Company of America, the
court, in denying recovery to the beneficiary for injury suffered by the insured as
the result of his wrongful assault upon another, clearly states the position of the
minority of the courts:
"Too great weight given to the intent of the aggressor or to theorizing on the ques-
tion of what he did foresee or should have been foreseen as the consequences of his
aggression may well produce a result contrary to the dictates of public policy. One
who voluntarily embarks upon a course of violence, criminal in nature, should be held
to be aware that he may not be able to control the circumstances sufficiently to avoid
untoward consequences." 5
The New York Court of Appeals, in Gaines v. Fidelity and Casualty Company
of New York, denied recovery where insured called one Connors vile names and
struck him a blow, in retaliation for which Connors shot and killed insured. The
court states:
"The testimony is quite sufficient to justify the conclusion that the deceased came
to his death as a result of an assault commited by him upon the person of Connors,
and that the shooting which followed it was the direct result of the assault, and that
2 29 Am. JUR., INSURANCE, § 981, pp. 737, 738.
3 American Life Insurance Company v. Morris, 72 So.2d 414, 415 (Ala. 1952).
4 Gilman v. New York Life Insurance Company, 190 Ark. 379, 79 S.W.2d 78 (1935).
5 194 Misc. 87, 84 N.Y.Supp.2d 433, 435 (1948).
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the injuries inflicted upon the deceased, and which caused his death, were intentional
and not accidental."' 6
Further, in Appel v. Aetna Life Insurance Company,7 the court held that
death or injury resulting from the voluntary act of the insured, every detail of
which was intended, so that nothing was unforeseen except the resulting injury,
was not caused by accidental means.
In the case of Harrison v. Prudential Insurance Company of America, the
court denied recovery under a policy providing for double indemnity for death
resulting from accidental causes because insured died as a result of injuries sus-
tamed in a fight in which he voluntarily engaged. The court reasoned:
"Where a life insurance policy provides for the payment of an additional amount equal
to the face of the policy in the event that the death of the insured should result directly
and independently of all other causes of bodily injuries effected solely through external,
violent and accidental causes, and in which the insured engaged voluntarily, there can
be no recovery under the double indemnity clause. While the death was accidental and
not intended, the means and cause of death were deliberate and premeditated and not
accidental." 8
And in Sweeney v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company,9 the court held, in a
fact situation similar to that recited in the preceding case, that where the insured
is not merely a participant in the assault but the instigator, "the hostilities being
wantonly provided by the insured and of such serious nature that he might reason-
ably have expected that indignation would be aroused and that injury might
result," the insurer is relieved of liability.
An Arkansas case0 followed the weight of authority and denied relief to the
insurer in a situation where an unarmed insured assaulted a person who he didn't
know was armed. The insured was shot and killed as a result; the court held that
if the insured is killed by another when that other is acting in his necessary self-
defense, the insurer has a complete defense in an action on the policy for acci-
dental death. The court did not, however, feel that on the facts of the case the
assaulted party took the life of the insured in his necessary self-defense and hence
ruled the death accidental.
The principal case clearly follows the reasoning employed by the decided
weight of authority in holding that the injury suffered by the insured as a result
of her affirmative act of assault should be deemed accidental if the injury received
is of a more serious degree than that anticipated by the insured or foreseen by him
before commencing the assault. Such a result places upon the insurer a burden
for which he did not contract. In fact, a burden for which he expressly provided
in the contract that he would not be liable. By its holding, the court is altering the
policy of insurance to provide protection against injuries which are the unfore-
seen consequences of a deliberate assault, rather than insuring against injuries
incurred as a result of accidental means. The majority view provides the insured
with the traditional loop-hole sought by all, who, after breaching their contract,
seek still to benefit from its provisions. While the minority, though possibly harsh
in certain isolated cases, requires fulfillment of the terms of the contract in order
to reap the benefits for which the insured paid premiums.
6 88 N.Y. 411, 81 N.E. 169 (1907).
7 83 N.Y.Supp. 238, aff'd, 180 N.Y. 514, 72 N.E. 1138 (1904).
8 54 Olio App. 279, 6 N.E.2d 991, 992 (1936).
930 Cal.App.2d 767, 92 P.2d 1045 (1936).
1o Gilman v. New York Life Insurance Company, 190 Ark. 379, 79 S.W.2d 78 (1935).
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